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This paper investigates the role of institutional differences at the local level as determinants of firms’ capital structure. 
Specifically, its aim is to empirically assess whether and to what extent SMEs’ financial decisions are affected by local 
financial development – evaluating this influence both ceteris paribus, and by allowing it to be conditional on different 
levels of legal enforcement inefficiency. Controlling for debt inertia, firms’ heterogeneity and endogeneity problems, we 
find that local financial development may be an important determinant of SMEs’ capital structure, and that firms appear 
to have better access to financial debt in areas characterized by a higher quality of the legal system. Thus, despite the in-
ternational process of capital markets integration, local financial institutions do not seem to become irrelevant for SMEs, 
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1. Introduction  
  
Despite financial integration has linked cross-country capital markets, allowing both beneficial ef-
fects by higher competition and efficiency and easier shocks’ contagious, local markets do not seem to 
have lost economic relevance (Guido et al 2004; Pollard 2003). In recent years, the research relating fi-
nancial paradigms to the economic role of geographical context has deepened the analysis about the ef-
fects of the local environment on firms’ financial behavior. Indeed, the characteristics of the local con-
text may exert a crucial role on corporate financial decisions, providing distorted investment incentives, 
modifying market expectations, disciplining management and raising financial constraints to firms’ 
growth. This paper aims to respond to the general call for integration between finance and economic 
geography research, by examining how firms’ financial decisions are related to the local institutional en-
vironment where entrepreneurships operate. 
Several contributions in the financial literature show that corporate financing choices are likely to be 
determined by a host of factors that are related not just to the characteristics of the firm, but also to the 
institutional environment where the latter operates (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998). Although most contribu-
tions examine corporate financing choices focusing on firm’s characteristics, a recent strand of literature 
studies the channels through which institutional factors may affect firms’ capital structure choices (De-
mirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 2008, 2002, 1998, 1996a; Cheng and Shiu 2007; Lopez-Iturriaga and Ro-
driguez-Sanz 2007; Utrero-González 2007; Bianco et al. 2005; Giannetti 2003; Titman et al. 2003; 
Booth et al. 2001; La Porta et al. 1997, 1998; Rajan and Zingales 1995).  
Most of this research used cross-country data to examine large firms facing a wide range of institu-
tional environments, while recent works have highlighted differences in institutional settings at local 
level (e.g. Guiso et al. 2004). The latter claim that, within a single country, local institutional differences 
can exist and might play a crucial role in determining corporate financial decisions. One of the local in-
stitutional characteristics that has received increasing interest from scholars is the degree of financial de-
velopment. Indeed, despite the process of financial markets integration and internationalization, local fi-
nancial markets may still be of great relevance in affecting firms’ capital structure, especially when firms 3 
 
cannot realize the benefits of moving to the international capital market or they consider it too costly and 
not easily accessible.  
Besides, several studies highlight the role of judicial enforcement in shaping the functioning of a fi-
nancial system, hence in affecting financing decisions (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998; Beck and Levine 
2004). Indeed, judicial enforcement is important as the regulations governing the financial system work 
in the interest of investors, protecting creditors only to the extent that the rules are actually enforced. Due 
to the risk of default and the difficulty to get back the liquidation value of the collateral, enforcement af-
fects the ex-ante availability of agents to provide finance. Likewise, as recent contributions point out 
(e.g. Utrero-González 2007; Giannetti 2003), by fostering financial market development, enforcement 
and investors’ protection contribute to mitigate agency problems.  
Inspired by the above literature, the present paper aims to empirically investigate whether and to what 
extent the financial decisions of small and medium sized firms (henceforth SMEs) are influenced by the 
degree of local financial development. We evaluate this relationship both ceteris paribus, and by allow-
ing the impact of the provincial financial development to be conditional on different levels of legal en-
forcement inefficiency. Thus, our work distinguishes itself from the extant literature as – in studying 
SMEs financial choices – it focuses on local instead of country factors, and it allows for interaction 
among different institutional features.  
Focusing on SMEs is relevant since, as shown by several contributions, the influence of local institu-
tional factors on capital structure decisions is particularly relevant for such firms, despite the internation-
al phenomenon of market integration. For example, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) highlight 
that institutional factors have a different impact on SMEs’ financial policies, compared to those of larger 
firms. Further, Beck et al. (2005) point out that market imperfections, such as those caused by underde-
veloped financial and legal systems, constrain funding decisions depending on firms’ size. 
This paper aspires to enrich both the finance and the economic geography literature, pointing out 
some implications for further analysis exploring how finance and economic geography can be welded 
more closely. Finance and economic geography are two areas of research that traditionally are studied 4 
 
separately, although they present many connections and both can provide better understanding about the 
firms’ behaviour in a local context.  
To carry out the empirical analysis we employ Italian data, as Italy provides an ideal laboratory to test 
the effect of local institutional factors on SMEs capital structure for at least two reasons. First, the Italian 
economy is dominated by SMEs. Secondly, it is widely documented that the efficiency of both financial 
and legal enforcement systems is quite dissimilar across the Italian local areas, despite a financial system 
and a legal/regulatory framework highly integrated and uniform.  
Following Guiso et al. (2004), we consider as local markets the 103 existing Italian administrative 
provinces (geographic entities very similar to the US counties). Also the Italian Antitrust Authority clas-
sifies the province as the 'relevant market’ in banking activities. Furthermore, the province was, until 
1990, the unit of analysis considered by the Bank of Italy to decide whether to authorize the opening of 
new branches.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief review of the li-
terature on the effects of local financial development on firms’ capital structure. Section 3 provides a 
short overview on SMEs and the financial system in Italy. Section 4 illustrates the econometric specifi-
cation and the methodology adopted. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 discuses the results ob-
tained, and section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Capital structure, financial development and enforcement at local level: from the extant lite-
rature to our testing hypotheses 
 
Capital structure is a controversial topic in academia and in the business community (Rajan and Zin-
gales 1995). The facts about capital structure show that the optimal mix between debt and equity is af-
fected by many factors, that raise benefits and costs.
1  There is a growing interest in empirically studying 
the connection between institutions and firms’ capital structure to understand debt versus equity choices 
                                                 
1 Firms that use debt as a source of finance can benefit from tax advantages, due to interest deduction, a reduction in asymmet-
ric information, and managerial discipline. Nonetheless, there are also costs related to the use of debt that arise from the pres-
ence of financial distress, agency problems, and a loss of financial flexibility. 5 
 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998). The main literature is based on cross-country analyses empha-
sizing the effects of institutional differences on capital structure (Titman et al. 2003; Booth et al. 2001; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999), and showing that financing decisions are shaped both by a 
country’s legal and financial environment (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998; Rajan and Zingales 
1998; La Porta et al. 1997, 1998). Specifically, the research on the relationship between law and finance 
takes into account the role of institutional factors, such as the efficiency of financial and enforcement 
systems (Lopez-Iturriaga and Rodriguez-Sanz 2007; Rajan and Zingales 2003; La Porta et al. 1998; De-
mirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1996a). Institutions that work efficiently can reduce problems of oppor-
tunism and asymmetric information, with significant effects on the relative magnitude of the costs and 
benefits associated to debt. The impact of financial development on financing decisions is becoming a 
major research priority considering that, as suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1998), financial develop-
ment facilitates firms’ growth, affecting capital structure decisions through the reduction of external fi-
nancing costs. Although previous studies are based on cross-country analysis (Demirguc-Kunt and Mak-
simovic 2008, 2002, 1999, 1998, 1996a, 1996b; Lopez-Iturriaga and Rodriguez-Sanz 2007; Utrero-
González 2007; La Porta et al. 1997; Rajan and Zingales 1995),
2 it may also be that, within a single 
country, differences in companies’ financial structure are explained by differences in the degree of fi-
nancial development at the local level. There is increasing evidence in the finance literature that the local 
context is relevant. Recent financial papers (Degryse and Ongena 2005; Petersen and Rajan 2002) high-
light the importance of distance in explaining the availability and pricing of bank loans. In particular, Pe-
tersen and Rajan (2002) document the importance of distance in the provision of bank credit to small 
firms, especially in countries where asymmetric information problems are substantial. Studies on the lo-
cal context are also close to contemporary debates in the economic geography literature, interested in 
understanding firm’s financing across different regional contexts (Martin 1999). Pollard (2003) suggests 
                                                 
2 For example, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) showed that differences in financing patterns are mostly due to differ-
ences in financial development, as well as in the underlying legal infrastructure. Fan et al. (2003) also confirmed earlier find-
ings that institutional differences among countries are much more important in determining firms’ capital structure choices 
compared to other factors, such as industry affiliation. 6 
 
the need of contextualizing firm finance, analyzing how different geographical configurations of finan-
cial institutions affect the access to credit for firms operating locally. In general, it is suggested that 
banks operating locally have more knowledge and control on local firms and entrepreneurs (Alessandrini 
and Zazzaro 1999). Both Martin (1999) and Pollard (2003), identifying a body of works about financial 
institutions, services and markets, proposed the need to integrate studies of finance and economic geo-
graphy, especially with regards to small firms. In particular, Pollard (2003, p.431) suggested the need of 
further studies in economic geography concerning “how and where firms obtain and use external finance 
and how capital structure are managed ”. Furthermore, with a distinctive approach, the regional econom-
ics literature has considered similar arguments, typically based on aggregate analysis related to the re-
gional impact of monetary policy. It has been suggested that, especially for SMEs, there are important 
regional differences in credit conditions (Dow and Montagnoli 2007).  
The above discussion shows that the effects of local financial development on capital structure deci-
sions have been investigated across various fields of research from different analytical perspectives. 
Considering that firms face several menus of choices, opportunities and constraints according to the 
geographic context in which they are embedded, analyzing the role of local financial development on 
debt choices can provide relevant insights. To assess the role of financial institutions in an increasingly 
integrated capital market we follow a distinctive approach. We study the effect of local financial devel-
opment within a single country, using an approach similar to Guiso et al. (2004) but applied at provincial 
level.  
As highlighted by Diamond (1993) and Flannery (1986), the existence of asymmetric information is 
likely to tilt capital structures toward a higher use of debt. According to Titman et al. (2003), key deter-
minants of the financial constraint, influencing firm’s capital-structure, may be the existence of asymme-
tric information and the cost of contracting between companies and potential providers of external fi-
nancing. Financial constraints are likely to be more severe in the presence of a poorly developed finan-7 
 
cial system.
3 By contrast, a well-developed financial system can facilitate the ability of a company to 
gain access to external financing, providing cheaper finance to worthy companies (Guiso et al. 2004). 
With a well-developed financial system market efficiency helps to avoid opportunistic behaviors.
4 Thus, 
across different provincial areas, an increase in financial development is assumed - ceteris paribus - to 
allow for a higher use of debt (hypothesis 1). Hence, finding that local financial development is a deter-
minant of firms’ financing decisions may suggest that, despite the international process of capital markets 
integration, we are far from the ‘end of geography’ or the flattening of spatial differentiation (O’Brien 
1992). Developed local financial intermediaries could still matter for the availability of financing sources 
stimulating growth.  
In addition to the function performed by the financial system, a burgeoning literature suggests to ac-
count also for the role of judicial enforcement in shaping the operation of a financial system, and so in 
affecting financing decisions.
5 In particular, the law and finance theory focuses on the role of legal insti-
tutions and enforcement in explaining international differences in financial development (La Porta et al. 
1997, 1998; Beck and Levine 2004). Specifically, the judicial enforcement is important because the reg-
ulations governing the financial system work in the interest of investors, protecting creditors only to the 
extent that the rules are actually enforced. Due to the risk of default and the difficulty to get back the li-
quidation value of the collateral, enforcement affects the ex-ante availability of agents to provide 
finance. As suggested by La Porta et al. (1998), because a good legal environment protects potential fin-
                                                 
3 It seems that firms may raise finance more easily as the financial system develops because physical collateral becomes less 
important while intangible assets and future cash flows can be financed. As the financial system develops, it should be better 
able to appreciate the soundness of firm’s projects and of its managerial behaviors (Rajan and Zingales 1998). 
4 For example, the less developed the financial system, the more banks will want to use short-term credit as a way to control 
borrowers (Diamond 1991). 
5 A selective review of the research on the role of legal institutions in shaping the functioning of financial systems is provided 
by Beck and Levine (2004). In particular, as highlighted by Beck and Levine (2004) and summarized by Hart (1995), studies 
on financial decisions are related to the role of the control rights that financial securities bring to their owners as well as to the 
impact of different legal rules on corporate control. Considering capital structure as a set of contracts, the enforcement of these 
latter determines the rights of securities holders and the functioning of financial systems. 8 
 
anciers against expropriation by entrepreneurs, it raises their willingness to provide funds to firms. Thus, 
as recent contributions highlight (e.g. Utrero-González 2007; Giannetti 2003), by fostering financial 
market development, enforcement and investors’ protection contribute to mitigate agency problems.  
The role of legal institutions and enforcement in explaining international differences in financial de-
velopment across countries (Beck and Levine 2004) can also apply with regards to within-country ana-
lyses: the efficiency of the courts at local level can be different although the same law applies. By pro-
viding diverse levels of creditors’ protections, the existence of differences in the quality of the enforce-
ment at local level affects local financial development. As suggested by the law and finance view, local 
financial development would be higher where judicial enforcement is more effective, while the financial 
support to firms would be lower where the quality of the legal system is weaker. Therefore, across dif-
ferent provincial areas, a more efficient enforcement system should strengthen the impact of local finan-
cial development on the use of SMEs’ debt. Stated differently, we expect that the higher the local judi-
cial costs the lower the impact of local financial development on leverage (hypothesis 2). To test this hy-
pothesis, we will model the partial effect of local financial development conditional on the efficiency of 
the local judicial enforcement. 
To summarize, building on the predictions of the literature above discussed, it seems noteworthy to 
verify whether differences in corporate financing decisions can be explained by institutional factors at 
local level. The analysis of the role of the local context can extend insight into a firm’s decisions regard-
ing capital structure and, in general, on the financial behaviors of firms. In particular, SMEs, which have 
limited access to alternative source of financing due to their informational opaqueness, seem potentially 
very sensitive to the degree of development and efficiency of the financial system (Berger and Udell 
1998). Cross-country research provided substantial evidence that small firms face significant growth 
constraints and have less access to formal sources of external finance, potentially explaining the lack of 
SMEs’ contribution to growth (Beck et al. 2008; Storey 1994). Financial and institutional development 
helps to alleviate SMEs’ growth constraints and to increase their access to external finance. The financ-
ing of SMEs occurs in an institutional context very different compared to that faced by a corporation, 
which operates in large and relatively more transparent capital markets (Berger and Udell 1998). If firms 9 
 
are able to penetrate markets other than the local one, local market conditions become irrelevant; how-
ever, due to the existence of market frictions especially with regards to SMEs, the local financial market 
can still be fundamental. Additionally, the local financial system is likely to exert dissimilar impacts in 
areas where the judicial enforcement is more effective – areas which may belong to the same country. In 
fact, though in a nation the same laws apply throughout, the enforcement system can differ at local level, 
thus providing creditors different levels of protection against opportunistic behaviors. Since both the de-
velopment of the financial system and the efficiency of the courts vary across the Italian territory, our 
country represents a noteworthy case study to shed light on the relationship between SMEs’ financing 
decisions and the institutional factors so far illustrated.  
 
 
3. A short overview on SMEs and the financial system in Italy 
 
Research on the Italian economy should take into account the distinct features of the country’s indus-
trial and financial structures. As far as the former is concerned, a first important aspect is that the vast 
majority of firms (more than 95%) are SMEs. While the proliferation of small-scale enterprises has often 
been pointed out as one of the reasons for Italy’s economic success, the limited types of external funds 
available to Italian companies make them prone to financing constraints. Cesarini (2003) highlights that, 
once internal funds are depleted, the banking channel is often the only way for Italian SMEs - usually 
facing high costs in employing arm’s length finance (bond and the Stock Exchange markets finance) - to 
gain access to external funds.  
Another relevant feature of Italian firms is that, for the most part, the model of corporate governance 
is quite different from the one proposed by Berle and Means (1932); that is, there is not a marked separa-
tion between ownership and control. Instead, it is widely documented that the ownership of most Italian 
companies, even large ones, is strongly concentrated and based on a family business model (Giacomelli 
and Trento 2005, Bianco and Casavola 1999). In a comprehensive study, La Porta et al. (1999) found 
that ownership in publicly traded Italian companies is highly concentrated within single families and 
controlling families participate in the top management levels. Ownership is even more concentrated 
among non-listed companies. This concentration, a by-product of the relative lack of protection of mi-10 
 
nority shareholders by Italian securities law, has been suggested to also restrict growth. The tight con-
centration of ownership has its pluses and minuses. On the minus side, it acts as a factor influencing fi-
nancial decisions and may serve as a constraint on firm’s expansion, since growth often requires a signif-
icant amount of outside financing, which reduces family control. 
Turning to the structure of the Italian financial system, one of its major characteristics is that of being 
strongly bank-oriented. In fact, capital markets in Italy are relatively undeveloped compared not only to 
the US ones but also, to some extent, to those of other large European countries. Like other continental 
European countries, the Italian stock market is not an important source of finance. Very few Italian 
companies trade publicly, not even companies that are quite large (e.g. Ferrero, Fininvest, Barilla).
6  
Despite its central role in the national economy, the Italian banking system was until recently state 
owned, heavily regulated and scarcely competitive.
 Up to the early 1990s, the main features of the bank-
ing industry were the result of the regulation introduced in 1936 in order to avoid banking instability. 
Many restrictions were laid down on banks’ activity - among which the total control upon entry and exit 
in the industry, as well as on branching decisions.  
A radical regulation reform, which started at the beginning of the past decade, has modified the above 
scenario (see Costi 2007 for a vast discussion on this normative). Primed by the new legislative frame-
work, the selling-off of state-held banking shares, large consolidation waves and a rapid growth of 
branches number transformed the physiognomy of the Italian banking sector. From 1990 to 2006, 444 
mergers and 205 acquisitions among Italian credit institutions (excluding operations that involved the 
same bank more than once) were completed. In the same period, the number of banks operating in the 
country dropped from 1064 to 793, whereas bank branches boosted from 17,721 to 32,337 (Bank of Italy 
Annual Reports 1991-2007). Focusing on the geographical expansion of banks following the deregula-
tion process, Benfratello et al. (2008) show that branch density at provincial level: i) has increased large-
ly, on average; ii) is characterized by a large interprovincial dispersion, and this latter has been increas-
ing with time; iii) displays much more variation between provinces than over time. Moreover, banks’ 
                                                 
6 In 2000, only 297 companies traded on the Milan Stock Exchange (266 in 1990 and 168 in 1980), and the total capitalized 
value of companies was 818,384 million of euro, approximately 70% of the national GDP. 11 
 
geographical expansion and consolidation activities led to a significant variation in banking concentra-
tion across the Italian provinces, which characterizes almost all the regions - as well as all the macro-
areas of the country (see also FinMonitor, 2006).  
Overall considered, the above figures suggest that the transformations intervened in the Italian bank-
ing sector during the last two decades have increased heterogeneity in the structure of credit markets, 
making the Italian experience a valuable scenario to conduct empirical studies on the implications that 
the degree of local banking development might have, for instance, on firms’ financial decisions. 
 
 
4. Empirical question and econometric methodology 
 
As mentioned above, the aim of this paper is to empirical assess whether and to what extent Italian 
SMEs’ capital structure is affected by local financial development – evaluating this relationship both ce-
teris paribus (hypotheses 1), and by allowing the impact of provincial financial development to be condi-
tional on different levels of legal enforcement inefficiency (hypothesis 2). To carry out this analysis, we 






t it t i it T X JUDCOST BRANCH JUDCOST BRANCH LEV LEV ε ϕ φ β β β β α + + + + + + + = ∑ −
'
4 3 2 1 , 1 *        (1) 
 
 
where indices i and t refer to individuals and time periods, respectively. According to equation (1), the 
capital structure decision (LEV) is a function of local financial development (BRANCH), local enforce-
ment (JUDCOST), the interaction between the latter two (BRANCH*JUDCOST), a set of control va-
riables and the lagged dependent variable. A variables’ description is provided in Table 1, while Table 2 
reports some descriptive statistics.
7  
 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 
 
The dependent variable (LEV) is calculated as the ratio of financial (or interest-bearing) debt (exclud-
ing trade debt) to the total financial debt plus equity (as in Titman et al. 2003, Giannetti 2003, Rajan and 
                                                 
7 The correlation matrix is available from the authors upon request. 12 
 
Zingales 1995). On the right hand side, BRANCH and JUDCOST are our measures of local financial 
development and inefficiency of the legal system, respectively.  
Following Benfratello et al. (2008), BRANCH is the provincial branch density (calculated as bank 
branches on population). The authors indicate at least two motivations to choose this variable as a meas-
ure of the level of local banking development. A first one is that it is widely used in the studies on local 
banking development (e.g. Degryse and Ongena, 2005). A second one, and perhaps more important, is 
that “it captures the dimension of banking development that is likely to be more heavily affected by the 
deregulation process” (Benfratello et al. 2008, p.200) – a process that, as outlined in section 3, greatly 
contributed to transform the physiognomy of the Italian banking system in the last two decades. 
Similarly to Fabbri and Padula (2004) and Bianco, Jappelli and Pagano (2005), JUDCOST is the ratio 
of backlog of pending civil trials to incoming civil trials.
 8 The hypothesis underlying the use of this va-
riable is that the quality of the legal enforcement system at local level depends inversely on the conges-
tion of the judicial district.  
The vector X of control variables accounts for observable firm-specific characteristics. Theoretical 
and empirical studies have shown that features such as size, age, profitability, non-debt tax-shields, tan-
gibility, trade debt and growth opportunities are likely to affect capital structure (e.g. Hall et al. 2004; 
Van der Wijst et al. 1993). Large firms tend to have more collateralizable assets and more stable cash 
flows (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Harris and Raviv 1991). Thus, the variable SIZE_E, measured by the 
number of firm’s employees, is included in the model. To account for informational opacity across the 
different stages of firm’s life cycle, the AGE variable is added. Most tax and asymmetric information 
models of capital structure predict a relationship between leverage and profitability (Rajan and Zingales 
1995; Harris and Raviv 1991). Thus, our empirical model includes the return on assets (ROA), expressed 
                                                 
8 The computation of JUDCOST relies on the trials at the first degree of judgment (lower court). However, as a robustness 
check (see subsection 5.1), we have also considered the trials at the second degree of judgment (appeal court). Lower court and 
appeal court represent the two degrees of judgment that Italian civil trials can undergo. Data on pending and incoming trials are 
available at judicial districts level only, these latter corresponding roughly to the Italian regions (for a matching of judicial dis-
tricts with regions and provinces, see Fabbri and Padula 2004).   13 
 
as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets. De Angelo and Masulis (1980) 
argue that firms that are able to reduce taxes using methods other than deducting interest, such as depre-
ciation, will employ less debt in their capital structure. The non-debt tax shields (NDTS) variable consi-
dered in this study is measured through the depreciation and amortization of tangible and intangible as-
sets divided by total assets (MacKie-Mason 1990). Tangible assets (TGASS) may provide collateral for 
loans, reducing agency costs and the cost for lenders, and thus are expected to be associated with higher 
leverage (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Titman and Wessels 1988). Firms with high growth opportunities 
may retain financial flexibility through a low leverage to be able to exercise those opportunities in sub-
sequent years (Myers 1977), while a firm with outstanding debt may forgo such opportunities (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). To capture this effect, we use a measure of firm’s growth (FGROW_S), given by 
the growth rate of annual net sales. Considering that trade debt may be a substitute for bank debt (De 
Blasio, 2005), the TRADE variable – expressed by the ratio of trade debt to total assets – is also in-
cluded. Vector X also comprises industry dummies (PAV), to control for heterogeneity at sectoral level,
9 
two variables at provincial level – the (log of) per capita real gross domestic product (GDPPC) and the 
ratio of bad loans to total loans (BAD), this latter as a proxy for credit market riskiness – and a territorial 
dummy (SOUTH), to account for the dualism in the degree of socio-economic development between 
Center-North and South (this variable is coded 1 for firms located in the southern regions, and zero oth-
erwise). Besides, Tt is a set of time fixed effects; it i it u + =ν ε is a composite error, where the individual 
effect (vi) summarizes unobserved firm’s characteristics (such as managerial risk aversion, governance 
structure, and other relevant factors that are difficult to measure) that are time-invariant, and have been 
acknowledged as potential determinants of capital structure decisions (Lemmon et al. 2008; Flannery 
and Rangan 2006). The second term (uit) captures idiosyncratic shocks to leverage.  
Finally, it is worth highlighting the inclusion of lagged leverage as an explanatory variable. This term 
enables us to account for the dynamics suggested by the literature on the capital structure adjustment 
process (Flannery and Rangan 2006; Leary and Roberts 2005; Welch 2004; Fama and French 2002; 
Bontempi and Golinelli 1996). These studies highlight that firms tend to achieve a desired leverage ratio 
                                                 
9 On the relevance of industry affiliation see, among others, Showalter (1999) and Harris and Raviv (1991). 14 
 
in the long-run, although they cannot completely adjust toward their optimal leverage in each period due 
to the presence of adjustment costs. Hence, partial adjustment models are advocated to estimate the capi-
tal structure adjustment process. 
To test our first hypothesis, we estimate equation (1) without considering the interaction term be-
tween BRANCH and JUDCOST. Then, to verify our second hypothesis, we estimate model (1) – which 
makes the effect of financial development conditional on different levels of enforcement inefficiency. 
Specifically, we consider the partial effect of BRANCH conditional on the level of judicial costs 
( JUDCOST * ˆ ˆ BRANCH / LEV 4 2 β β + = ∂ ∂ ), and the relative standard errors.
10 Since both are dependent 
on JUDCOST, the marginal effect of BRANCH may change sign and gain or lose significance accord-
ing to the value of the enforcement variable. To provide a concise report on these figures, we will graph 
the marginal effect of BRANCH - along with its 95% (or 90%) confidence intervals - across the range of 
the JUDCOST regressor. 
From an econometric perspective, controlling for leverage inertia and unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. 
adopting a dynamic panel model as the one specified in equation (1)) poses two major problems. The 
first involves the potential correlation between fixed effects and regressors. The second concerns the cor-
relation between the lagged dependent variable and the past idiosyncratic error. This latter link makes 
the strict exogeneity assumption fail, compromising the consistency of the most popular methods em-
ployed in a static panel data setting (random effects, fixed effects and first differencing). Moreover, in 
model (1) the lag of the leverage measure is not the only endogenous variable. In fact, also other expla-
natory variables are likely to be endogenous.
11 
A general approach for coping with both the above mentioned problems consists of two steps. First 
the data are transformed in order to eliminate the unobserved individual effects, and then valid instru-
mental variables are employed in order to deal with the endogeneity problem. Arellano and Bond (1991) 
                                                 
10 Formally, the latter are:  ) ˆ , ˆ cov( * JUDCOST 2 ) ˆ var( * ) JUDCOST ( ) ˆ var( ˆ 4 2 4
2
2 β β β β σ + + =    
11 We treat as endogenous the variables that are likely to be determined simultaneously along with the leverage (BRANCH, 
BRANCH* JUDCOST, SIZE, ROA, NDTS, TGASS, TRADE, FGROW_S and BAD). The remaining regressors are treated as 
exogenous.  15 
 
propose a GMM procedure, exploiting the entire set of internal instruments that the model generates, 
under the assumption of white noise errors. When the explanatory variables are persistent over time, 
however, the lagged level may result in poor instruments. Since our variables of interest (BRANCH and 
JUDCOST) display little variation over time, in what follows we adopt the so-called system GMM (SYS-
GMM) estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator employs 
extra orthogonality conditions that “remain informative even for persistent series, and it has been shown 




5. Data  
 
The econometric analysis is based on data coming from several sources. Information on Italian manu-
facturing firms is drawn from Capitalia’s 7
th, 8
th and 9
th surveys (Indagini sulle Imprese Manifatturiere), 
conducted on all Italian manufacturing firms employing more than 500 workers and on a stratified sam-
ple of firms with more than 10 workers. Each of these surveys, including mostly qualitative information, 
spans three years: the 7
th survey, carried out in 1998, reports data for a panel of 4,493 firms for the pe-
riod 1995-1997; the 8
th one was conducted in 2001 and has data for a panel of 4,680 firms for the years 
1998-2000, and the 9
th, in 2004, on 4,289 firms for the period 2001-2003. Capitalia provides also bal-
ance-sheet data on the firms included in the surveys. By matching qualitative and accounting informa-
tion, we obtain an unbalanced panel of 5,998 firms for the period 1995-2003, for a total of 25,530 obser-
vations. As abovementioned, we focus on SMEs - which are bound to ask credit from banks with 
branches in the same local market where they operate. Therefore, we drop firms with more than 250 
workers and those listed on the Stock Exchange.  
A second data source, which gives us figures on the territorial distribution of branches for each Italian 
bank over the period considered in the analysis, is provided by the Bank of Italy. From the same data-
base we draw information on banks’ non-performing loans and banks’ total loans (both at provincial 
                                                 
12 More precisely, the system GMM estimator, along with the moment conditions of the difference GMM, uses the lagged dif-
ferences of the regressors as instruments for the equation in levels. The main assumption underlying the use of moment restric-
tions in levels is that the unobserved effects are not correlated with changes in the error term.  16 
 
level), to compute the BAD variable. Finally, data on pending and incoming civil trials, GDP and popu-




6. Empirical Results 
 
The SYS-GMM results are reported in Table 3. Column 1 shows the results obtained when estimating 
equation (1) without considering the interaction term between BRANCH and JUDCOST.
 The key as-
sumptions are verified. The autocorrelation tests signal a strong first order correlation in the differenced 
residuals, but no higher order autocorrelation, therefore supporting the assumption of lack of autocorre-
lation in the errors in levels, underlying the adopted estimator.
14 Further, the Hansen test cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of validity of the over-identifying restrictions, and the difference in Hansen test sup-
ports the validity of the additional instruments used by the SYS-GMM estimator.
15 
Many control variables are statistically significant and their estimated coefficients are generally con-
sistent with those found in previous studies.
16 For instance, SIZE has a positive and statistically signifi-
cant effect on leverage: older firms, which are likely to have more stable cash flows and a track record of 
their business activity, seem to obtain more financial resources in terms of debt. The variable ROA has a 
negative and statistically significant effect on leverage, suggesting that higher profitability - possibly mi-
tigating problems of asymmetric information in accessing capital markets - may allow managers to be 
less dependent on creditors for financial resources. The NDTS parameter is negative and statistically 
                                                 
13 To moderate the influence of potential outliers, for each variable involved in the econometric analysis, the observations lying 
in the first and last percentile of the distribution have been dropped.  
14 Indeed, if the errors in level are characterized by a lack of serial correlation, the error in differences are expected to display 
first order autocorrelation and to be uncorrelated at all other lags.  
15 The estimates are obtained by using a subset of the available instruments. This is because, as Altonji and Segal (1994) point 
out, the use of all instruments implies small-sample downward bias of the coefficients and standard errors. Further reducing the 
number of instruments - or using all those available - does not affect our main results.  
16 The standard errors (not reported) are consistent in the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
within panels.  17 
 
significant as well; thus, managers seem to prefer reducing debt when it is possible to use non-debt tax 
shields.
17 BRANCH and JUDCOST are both positive and not statistically significant. 
 
Insert Table 3 
 
Column 2 of Table 3 reports the estimates of model (1). Specification tests and control variables’ es-
timated coefficients are similar to those discussed for column 1. Looking at the individual sign and signi-
ficance of our key variables, the BRANCH estimated parameter appears positive and significantly re-
lated to leverage. Given the presence of the interaction term, though, such a positive effect corresponds 
to the marginal effect of BRANCH only when the JUDCOST variable is equal to zero, which clearly 
does not represent a noteworthy case. The JUDCOST estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. 
Again, given the inclusion of the interaction term, this means that our legal enforcement indicator does 
not influence the dependent variable when the number of branches is zero, another meaningless case. 
The interaction term (BRANCH*JUDCOST) is not statistically significant. An F-test, however, supports 
the hypothesis of joint significance of BRANCH and its interaction term.
18 The negative sign of the latter 
indicates that, as expected, the positive BRANCH effect tends to decrease as JUDCOST raises. As men-
tioned in the previous section, however, these figures do not convey full information on the magnitude, 
                                                 
17 For the sake of completeness, we also mention that the positive effect of TGASS supports the hypothesis that fixed assets, 
providing better collateral, can foster the future capability to repay and guarantee the loan. The positive sign of the TRADE 
variable indicates that trade debt may have a complementary effect to that of financial debt. Further, higher growth opportuni-
ties seem to be associated with a lower use of debt, possibly implying the usage of other forms of ‘patient’ funds. The industry 
dummies (PAV) coefficients, in all cases statistically significant, provide evidence of the existence of different financial behav-
iours across industries. Finally, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable provides evidence that firms face relatively 
relevant transaction costs in the adjustment process to their optimal debt ratio. 
18 The divergence between individual and joint significance is usually interpreted as a symptom of multicollinearity (see Bram-
bor et al. 2006 and Wooldridge 2003) induced by the inclusion of an interaction term. As Brambor et al. (2006) highlight, 
‘‘even if there really is high multicollinearity and this leads to large standard errors on the model parameters, it is important to 
remember that these standard errors are never in any sense too large… they are always the ‘correct’ standard errors. High mul-
ticollinearity simply means that there is not enough information in the data to estimate the model parameters accurately and the 
standard errors rightfully reflect this’’.  18 
 
sign and significance of the marginal effect of BRANCH (neither of JUDCOST). Since we are interested 
in appraising whether the BRANCH’s effect on leverage is different in magnitude and significance ac-
cording to the level of JUDCOST, we have to consider the estimated marginal impact of BRANCH and 
its confidence intervals for all JUDCOST values. Being the latter a continuous variable, it is useful to 
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According to the above graph, the influence of financial development on the amount of SMEs’ debt 
is indeed dependent on the judicial system efficiency. At low levels of judicial costs, the BRANCH es-
timated marginal effect is positive and statistically significant (the confidence band does not include the 
zero line). When such costs increase, the impact of BRANCH decreases, turning to be statistically not 
significant beyond a threshold value of about three. More than 91% of our sample observations fall with-
in the significance region.  
Summarizing, our evidence suggests that the degree of local financial development is a statistically 
significant determinant of SMEs’ capital structure decisions, but its relevance decreases at higher level 
of local courts inefficiency.  
 19 
 
6.1 Robustness Checks 
 
We first check the sensitivity of our results to the specification adopted. Results do not substantially 
change neither when controlling for non-linearity of firms’ size and age (i.e. the squares of SIZE_E and 
AGE are added to equation (1)), nor when including the (log of) provincial population. Findings are ro-
bust also when controlling for the local credit market size by using the (log of) deposits in the province. 
Besides, none of the added variables is statistically significant. These results are not reported to avoid 
cluttering, but they are available from the authors upon request. 
Similarly, the outcome remains substantially unaltered both when we include in the equation (1) a 
dummy variable (GRUP) to control for firms membership
19 (see column 3 of Table 3), and when replace 
some controls with other ones. In column 4 of Table 3, firm’s growth is measured in terms of number of 
employees (FGROW_E), rather than net sales (FGROW_S); in column 5, the number of firms’ em-
ployees is replaced by the log of total assets per employer (SIZE_TA/E); in column 6 JUDCOST is re-
placed with JUDCOST2, the latter being the ratio of backlog of pending civil trials to incoming civil tri-
als (first and second degree of judgment). 
20 
Finally, we consider the disparity characterizing the two biggest macro-areas of the country. Indeed, 
the South of Italy has a poorer institutional environment, characterized by a less developed and efficient 
financial system, as well as by a lower quality of the enforcement system. To allow for different coeffi-
cients in the two mentioned macro-areas, we split the sample according to firms’ geographical location 
(see columns 7 and 8 of Table 3). Not reported graphs (but available upon request) show that while in 
the northern regions the marginal impact of BRANCH is statistically significant for most observations, 
                                                 
19 This dummy is 1 if firms belong to groups and zero otherwise. 
20 Moreover, to take into account that unobserved (or not easily measurable) factors reflecting provincial characteristics may 
imply some correlation among the error terms over time for firms belonging to the same area, we re-estimate our benchmark 
model by clustering the observations at province level. The results obtained from this estimation confirm our main conclusions, 
but we do not report them since the value of the Hansen test and that of the difference-in-Hansen do not appear reliable (both p-
value are equal to one). Indeed, as Roodman (2009) points out, when clustering in GMM-SYS “the standard errors and specifi-
cation tests reported [… ] are consistent only as the number of clusters grows large”. Our clusters are 102 (missing firms from 
Enna, a Sicilian province). 20 
 
for the southern ones BRANCH is not significant for any level of legal system efficiency. The latter re-
sult, though, has to be considered with caution, as – given the limited sub-sample size – the Hansen and 
difference in Hansen tests are weakened by the presence of many instruments. 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks  
 
The present study has analyzed the influence of institutional differences at the local level on Italian 
SMEs’ capital structure choices, taking into account the interaction between local financial development 
and the effectiveness of the local enforcement system. Controlling for financial debt inertia, endogeneity 
problems and firms’ heterogeneity, local financial development appears to exert a significant role in af-
fecting SMEs’ debt capacity, conditioned by the quality of the local enforcement system.  
According to our main findings, corporate financial decisions seem to be not only the result of firm/ 
industry specific characteristics, but also a by-product of the institutional environment in which firms 
operate. Thus, despite the international process of capital markets integration, the local institutional con-
text still seems to matter for Italian SMEs. In particular, higher levels of local financial development ap-
pear associated to easier access to external financial resources.  
Further, a more efficient local judicial system appears to amplify the positive relationship between fi-
nancial development and firms’ capital structure, possibly as intermediaries may be more inclined to 
provide funds where the enforcement system enables a more effective credit protection. In other words, 
higher quality of the local enforcement system shows a relevant indirect effect on firm’s financial deci-
sions, allowing SMEs to obtain credit more easily. Where local enforcement system is more efficient, 
banks may be less frightened of firms exhibiting opportunistic behaviour; vice versa, if it is difficult to 
enforce loan covenants, bankers could prefer to provide less credit - being scared of ex-post opportunis-
tic problems. 
Broadly speaking, our study suggests that it may be relevant to jointly consider financial development 
and enforcement at local level as crucial determinants of SMEs’ capital structure decisions. Thus, a poli-
cy implication of our results is the need to improve local financial development – while considering that 
the way financial system affects firms’ decisions is qualified by the local courts’ efficiency. Indeed, an 21 
 
improvement in the local enforcement system can play an important role in creating the conditions for 
better relationships between firms and banks, reducing asymmetric information and agency problems, 
hence increasing credit availability for entrepreneurships. 22 
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LEV Financial debt (excluding trade debt) to (total financial debt plus equity)
BRANCH  Bank branches (*10000) to population
JUDCOST Backlog of pending civil trials to incoming civil trials (first degree of judgement)
SIZE_E Number of firm's employees
AGE  Current year minus firm’s year of establishment 
ROA  EBIT (earnings before income taxes) to total assets
NDTS  Depreciation of physical assets and intangible assets to total assets
TGASS  Property, plant, equipment and land to total assets
FGROW_S  Annual growth rate of firm's net sales
TRADE Trade debt to total assets
PAV1 Dummy =1 if firms belong to the traditional sectors and zero otherwise
PAV2 Dummy =1 if firms belong to the scale sectors and zero otherwise
PAV3 Dummy =1 if firms belong to the specialized supplier sectors and zero otherwise
PAV4 Dummy =1 if firms belong to the science based sectors and zero otherwise
GDPPC GDP per capita
BAD  Bad loans to total loans 
SOUTH Dummy =1 if firms belong to Southern regions and zero otherwise
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
LEV
 a 23.39 22.63 0 76.72 18,281
BRANCH 5.80 1.47 1.51 10.29 18,281
JUDCOST 2.10 0.57 0.06 5.05 18,280
SIZE_E
 b 47 44 5 250 18,281
AGE 
b 23 14 2 80 18,265
ROA 
a 7.19 6.32 -11.65 33.33 18,281
NDTS 
a 4.43 2.84 0.35 15.78 18,281
TGASS
 a 22.69 14.99 0.81 67.42 18,281
FGROW_S
 a 5.09 17.31 -36.67 82.91 13,614
TRADE 
a 19.99 16.74 0 68.41 18,281
PAV1 0.53 0.50 0 1 18,232
PAV2 0.19 0.39 0 1 18,232
PAV3 0.25 0.43 0 1 18,232
PAV4 0.04 0.19 0 1 18,232
GDPPC 
c 21.23 4.70 8.89 31.97 18,281
BAD
 a 6.14 5.42 1.44 45.25 18,244
SOUTH 0.14 0.35 0 1 18,281
All the variables are drawn from the 7th, 8th and 9th Capitalia's surveys (Indagini sulle Imprese Manufatturiere) with the
exception of: i) BRANCH and BAD, computed on data coming from Bank of Italy and ISTAT databases; ii) JUDCOST and
GDPPC drawn from ISTAT. BRANCH, GDPPC and BAD are measured at provincial level, while JUDCOST at judicial district
level.
TABLE 1 - Description of variables used in the estimations
TABLE 2 - Summary statistics
a In percentage terms;
b in units;
c in thousands of Euro. The other variables are dummies. For the description of the variables














LEV_1 0.557 0.555 0.551 0.559 0.557 0.556 0.559 0.555
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
BRANCH 0.567 1.992 2.092 2.446 1.903 2.283 1.864 -0.146
0.283 0.087 0.070 0.039 0.074 0.064 0.198 0.963
JUDCOST 0.235 3.263 3.679 4.955 3.243 3.402 0.791
0.549 0.263 0.204 0.102 0.215 0.444 0.833
JUDCOST_2 4.027
0.185
BRANCH*JUDCOST -0.567 -0.642 -0.889 -0.557 -0.535 -0.195
0.290 0.228 0.110 0.246 0.467 0.869
BRANCH*JUDCOST_2 -0.706
0.204
SIZE_E 0.047 0.050 0.048 0.039 0.050 0.049 0.035
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.140
SIZE_TA/E 5.077
0.000
AGE -0.210 -0.214 -0.118 0.045 0.070 -0.215 -0.343 1.217
0.511 0.509 0.727 0.892 0.811 0.507 0.325 0.094
ROA -0.276 -0.286 -0.296 -0.267 -0.227 -0.287 -0.287 -0.261
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.118
CASHFLOW
NDTS -1.007 -1.150 -1.126 -1.034 -0.883 -1.157 -1.073 -1.711
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TGASS 0.255 0.235 0.229 0.251 0.261 0.236 0.210 0.288
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
FGROW_S -0.126 -0.140 -0.124 -0.097 -0.139 -0.141 -0.064
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.156
FGROW_E -0.098
0.114
TRADE 0.317 0.315 0.309 0.317 0.313 0.315 0.309 0.260
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004
GROUP 0.779
0.498
PAV2 -0.914 -0.717 -0.821 -0.997 -1.145 -0.710 -0.470 -1.541
0.034 0.098 0.061 0.021 0.011 0.101 0.307 0.198
PAV3 -0.777 -0.815 -0.880 -0.752 -0.240 -0.801 -0.685 -2.187
0.052 0.042 0.030 0.064 0.548 0.046 0.102 0.063
PAV4 1.750 1.890 1.813 1.940 2.151 1.902 2.380 -0.228
0.032 0.022 0.030 0.020 0.009 0.022 0.007 0.915
GDPPC -1.851 -3.218 -3.489 -3.579 -3.571 -3.246 -4.502 0.883
0.300 0.101 0.073 0.073 0.063 0.092 0.057 0.925
BAD -0.074 -0.135 -0.157 -0.207 -0.150 -0.143 -0.301 -0.274
0.477 0.289 0.213 0.117 0.217 0.253 0.210 0.088
SOUTH -0.059 0.175 0.023 -0.360 -0.728 0.089
0.968 0.892 0.986 0.782 0.578 0.945
TABLE 3 - Estimation results. Dynamic panel-data estimation. One-step system GMM
(continued)














N.obs 12,942 12,942 12,919 12,514 12,651 12,942 11,137 1,805
F-test (BRANCH, INT) 2.61 2.55 2.57 2.32 2.67 2.26 0.14
0.074 0.079 0.077 0.099 0.070 0.105 0.868
F-test (BRANCH, JUDCOST, INT) 2.51 2.44 2.17 2.36 2.41 2.27 0.12
0.057 0.062 0.089 0.070 0.065 0.079 0.950
Model-test 115.65 110.41 106.45 115.02 107.17 110.27 108.11 25.04
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AB test (AR1)-FD -12.63 -12.75 -12.64 -12.08 -12.75 -12.74 -13.11 -3.73
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AB test (AR2)-FD 1.02 1.03 0.97 0.94 1.10 1.03 -0.61 2.72
0.308 0.303 0.333 0.345 0.271 0.304 0.544 0.007
Hansen test  268.39 292.8 317.0 281.4 305.2 293.3 305.4 189.0
0.167 0.220 0.192 0.382 0.102 0.214 0.101 1.000
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity 


















In Italics are reported the p-values of the tests. For the description of the variables included in the benchmark model (column 1) see Table 1. GROUP (in column 3) is a dummy
variable which is one if a firm belong to a group and zero otherwise. FGROW_E (in column 4) is the annual growth rate of firm's employees. SIZE_TA/E (in column 5) is the ratio of
total assets to the number of firm's employees. JUDCOST_2 (in column 6) is the ratio of backlog of pending civil trials to incoming civil trials (first and second degree of judgement).
The variables SIZE_TA/E, AGE(+1) and GDPPC are in natural logarithms. Constant and time dummies included but not reported. AB test (AR1)-FD and AB test (AR2)-FD stand for
Arellano-Bond test for AR in first differences and Arellano-Bond test for AR in second differences, respectively. 
TABLE 3 (continued) - Estimation results. Dynamic panel-data estimation. One-step system GMM
DEPENDENT VARIABLE (LEV)